The Danger of Intelligence Politicization

The Danger of Intelligence Politicization National Intelligence Council (NIC) remains the America’s most important agency in charge of the country’s security. It is charged with the responsibility of enhancing the depth and accuracy of intelligence investigation and integration of domestic and foreign dimensions of the country’s intelligence.Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on The Danger of Intelligence Politicization specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More This is done to ensure that the threats to United States’ national security are fully understood and probed.1 National Intelligence Council has had its fair share of successes in predicting possible security threats to the United States and its allies. However, it has also received some criticism for its failure to predict or accurately evaluate some security threats to the country.2 For instance, National Intelligence Council has faced various challenges in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the nuclear threat posed by Iran. The agency has had several intelligence failures in the two instances mentioned above, and they are highlighted below. According to Zegart in her article â€Å"Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis†, US National Intelligence Council failed to fully foresee the intentions of the Soviet leader (Khrushchev), in placing nuclear weapons in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis3. The intelligence officers were only worried about political fallout in Cuba and its effects in other Latin American countries rather than cared about a military threat the country could have had. The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) provided indicated that the Soviet leader had been unwilling to set up a military base in Cuba in almost two decades, and there was no short or midterm anticipation of such an activity by Khrushchev in Cuba. The estimates also strongly indicated that the Soviet bloc would not have wished to engage its military forc es in case Cuba had been attacked by the United States. However, it was realized that there were many Soviet troops who had arrived in the country and seemed to be ready to defend it from foreign attacks. This was another failure by US National Intelligence Council in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The NIC also insisted on the issue that installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba by the Soviet Union would go against the Soviet policies.Advertising Looking for essay on international relations? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Another failure by National Intelligence Council was the inability to accurately estimate the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba during the period preceding the crisis. In the recent times, US National Intelligence Council has come under scrutiny once again because of its failures in accurately reading the Iranian nuclear situation.4 National Intelligence Council used strong words to suggest that Iran had dropped its ambitions to build nuclear weapons in 2003, and this created a false sense of security. It indicated that Tehran lacked the prerequisite technical knowhow to build nuclear weapons and had consequently opted to halt its nuclear program.5 However, this turned out to be the exact opposite of the situation on the ground as Iran continued to vigorously pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions. In reality, the country divided its nuclear program into three phases which included fissile material production, missile development and building of warheads. In his article titled, â€Å"Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking Don’t Mix†, Kissinger (para, 3) notes that the country indeed increased the pace of fissile material production and showed impressive technological capabilities in its missile development since its missiles had increased ranges6. The payload of its new missile has also risen.7 Recent information from National Intelligence Coun cil indicated that the country had the capacity to produce adequate enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons and the number of warheads produced would increase between 2010 and 2015. This contradicts the initial statement by National Intelligence Council on Iran’s nuclear program. Bolton (para, 6) argues in his article â€Å"The Flaws In the Iran Report† that the National Intelligence Estimates were self-contradicting and not sufficiently supported by implying that Tehran was likely to give in to diplomatic persuasion and international community pressure8. The Director of National Intelligence (para 6) stated in his report that Iran had stopped its nuclear program due to international pressure even though it is was noted that the country alongside North Korea were two of the most difficult countries to deal with diplomatically, particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons.9Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on The Danger of Intelligence Politici zation specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Despite these failures by National Intelligence Council to precisely read and interpret intelligence reports, it can be argued that the NIC has shown impressive successes in acquisition of vital security information. National Intelligence Council has been successful in obtaining information, which has been vital in preventing crisis from intensifying and resulting into wars. For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the photo obtained by the NIC from aerial reconnaissance proved to be very useful in actual discovery of Soviet missiles and military personnel in Cuba before the weapons became operational. This proved a major turning point in the standoff and it gave the United States a piece of evidence which it could have used against the Soviet government and ultimately pressurized it to rescind its deal with Cuba.10 From the challenges National Intelligence Council experienced in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it became apparent that there was a need to integrate activities of its various intelligence groups since some of the security threats posed to the country appeared to be coordinated from different fronts. The success of the photographic evidence obtained from the aerial reconnaissance during the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in appreciation of the capabilities of aerial reconnaissance and influenced the decision to fully incorporate satellite photography in monitoring of disarmament agreements. This was later used to monitor progress in the Iranian missile program.11 The effort made by the government to reduce on budgetary expenditures and prioritize its services to the public is a critical provision not only to the military but also to other developmental sectors as well. Nonetheless, intelligence and security sectors have fundamental/conventional requirements and priorities that cannot be compromised at any cost. From experience, it is evident that the Amer ica’s military bases in Cuba and Iran had advantageous priorities that could only be met by allocating to them enough budgets and enhancing intelligence provisions as well as enough contingency funds. This move was effective but it might also pose critical impacts on the security of the nation.12Advertising Looking for essay on international relations? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More National Intelligence Council has also become more apt in evaluating intelligence information and minimized inaccurate analysis and conclusions on security threats after the Cuban crisis. The NIC has also been successful in stifling Iran’s nuclear program even though it has not been fully stopped. Due to the impact of the NIC’s activities, Iran temporarily halted its nuclear program and has been forced to conduct its program in a more restricted manner. Some could argue that this is a more dangerous situation since it becomes impossible to fully comprehend the extent of the program’s progress. However, it is important to realize that by limiting Iran’s ability to brazenly continue with its nuclear program, National Intelligence Council has ensured that the rate of production of the nuclear weapons was effectively reduced and the ability of the country to seek external assistance to its program was also limited.13 The NIC is vital in formulation of the pol icies and has been greatly applied in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Iran nuclear program. Prior to receiving concrete intelligence, the United States was unable to have a clear understanding of the magnitude of the Soviet’s activities in Cuba.14 This prevented decisive action being taken against the Soviet Union or Cuba. Based on intelligence obtained, the United States government was able to convince the Soviet Union to halt its activities in Cuba, and it even resulted in Khrushchev being overthrown in his country. Discussing how deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis Evidently, deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis in diverse ways. The personal skills and competencies that allowed US militants to manage their emotions, perceptions, and feelings and those of other individuals were really compromised during the entire crisis.15 The situation requires one to have the capability of coping up with other people, situat ions, and any environment of existence. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Iranian Nuclear Threat led to a number of negative effects. The American economy was greatly affected considering that they spent a lot of money in buying the equipments which were used to fight the Taliban. The war resulted in the death of many US soldiers as well as Cuban and Iranian people. For instance, statistics indicate that approximately 2,000 American soldiers and 10,000 affected country’s soldiers died. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Iranian Nuclear Threat also present certain realities of loses to both Cuban and Iranian citizens and the United States. To begin with, war against the terrorists led to massive damages to Afghanistan infrastructure. To retaliate against the attacks by US soldiers, the insurgents targeted public utilities where they destroyed properties and infrastructure. In addition, intelligence failures led to death of many people at the range of 224,000 to 258,000 who were s oldiers, terrorists as well as innocent citizens. Moreover, intelligence failure led to great waste of money by both the American government and the insurgents. For instance, the current statistics unveil that American government spent a total of at least $3.7 trillion on the operation. This value would be likely to rise to the excess of $4.4 trillion if the war continued as planned by the US government. Many American soldiers also died in the battlefield with some of those who survived the aftermath succumbing to post traumatic disorder.16 In the context of US intelligence capabilities, the war in Cuba and Iran had deep-rooted historical causes and aftermaths that were hard to assume or ignore when analyzing them. In other contexts, US National Intelligence Council believed that Taliban allowed terrorist groups like the forbidden al-Qaeda to establish training camps within Afghanistan. This situation coupled with the destructive facts of 9/11 and believable intelligence that the pe rpetrators were in hideouts in Afghanistan made US government plan military attack in the region. Upon completion of the plans, the US military began official â€Å"Operation Enduring Freedom† in Afghanistan in October 2001. In November 2001, US together with friendly armies managed to destroy militant camps as well as arrest some members of the insurgent groups and terminate the Taliban rule. This marked the actual beginning of the war in Afghanistan and projected specifically against the Islamist militias. This also indicates how the deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis.17 As much as the motive behind the war in Cuba and Iran related to the desire to restore freedom in the countries, American interest in the oil and minerals in the foreign land confirmed by its continued stay in the countries compromised its intelligence. Despite the criticisms directed against the American government from both within and outside the USA for its continued stay in Iran even after establishment of a democratic government, American government seemed reluctant to recall its soldiers due to poor intelligence issues.18 One of the reasons earmarking the stand by US government relates to the fact that Taliban and other supporting militant groups were fighting to resume leadership over Afghanistan and Iran. Return of Taliban is likely to destabilize and compromise the freedom and democracy currently enjoyed by Afghanistan citizens. This also explains how the deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis.19 This was another failure by the NIC in the Cuban Missile Crisis. As mentioned earlier, National Intelligence Council also insisted on the issue that installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba by the Soviet Union would have gone against the Soviet policies. Another failure by the Council was the inability to accurately estimate the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba during the period preceding the crisis. In recent ti mes, National Intelligence Council has come under scrutiny for its failures in accurately estimating the Iranian nuclear situation. In the context of military capabilities, it is agreeable that there exist serious impacts of the government move to cut down on the budgets of the military as stated before. Nonetheless, this can only be proved in the context of its weightiness upon investigation, compilation of the findings, analysis, and other critical research provisions.20 For the intelligence unit to provide a wide range of combat ability, their intelligence capabilities and budget allocation should be optimal. Since there are also emergency cases related to security, such intelligence issues should cater for any eventuality regarding security. Precisely, the exact intelligence impacts should cut on the security of military bases through appropriate methodology and government support. The impacts of how deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis related to the ability to adjust to the environment where one exists and ability to cope up with other people within the same environment. In the context of intelligence deficiency, this phenomenon is mostly evident in the war places where soldiers tend to face different opinions, cultures, races, ages, and other provisions that make them different. Intelligence confers the aspects of self awareness as indicated previously. Anybody with viable personality must possess the aspects of self awareness following its merits and contribution to viable personality within one’s self. Evidently, institutions with intelligence capabilities do not allow their emotions to rule their destiny and how they relate to the other people. They are able to trust only themselves in every situation since they cannot let themselves go off the hook. Such aspects have proved quite considerable, applicable, and embraceable by masses especially in the USA’s context. Intelligence capabilities relates to the a spects of being honest with one’s self, which is a fact conferred by emotional intelligence. It is from this concept that numerous individuals find themselves quite useful within an organization.21 It is important to note that National Intelligence has had its fair share of successes in predicting possible security threats to United States and its allies. Nonetheless, it has also received some criticism for its failure to predict or accurately evaluate some security threats to the country. For instance, National Intelligence Council has faced various challenges in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the nuclear threat posed by Iran. Moreover, the intervention of American soldiers that triggered the Afghanistan war helped in restoring a democratic government that is working to ensure useful and beneficial exploration of the country’s natural resources.22 Through intelligence, it is without doubt that even if the USA benefits from the oil and other minerals, Afghanistan citizen s also realize positive economic, social and political growth due to US support and investments. In addition, the war in Afghanistan that led to manhunt of al-Qaeda and other Islamist militias and eventual killing of personalities like Osama Bin Laden marks important mileage in antiterrorist wars. It is also important to note that US NIC has become more inapt in evaluating intelligence information and minimized inaccurate analysis and conclusions on security threats.23 It has also been unsuccessful in stifling Iran and Korean’s nuclear program failing to fully stop it. Due to the impact of the National Intelligence’s activities, Iran temporarily halted its nuclear program and has now been forced to conduct its program in a more restricted manner. This equally indicated how the deficiencies in US intelligence capabilities impacted on the crisis. Bibliography Adelberg, Michael S. The American Revolution in Monmouth County: The Theatre of Spoil and Destruction. Charleston , SC: History Press, 2010. Betts, Richard K. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007. Bolton, John. â€Å"The Flaws In the Iran Report†. Washington Post, December 2007. Davis, Jack. â€Å"Sherman Kents Final Thoughts On Analyst-Policymaker Relations: The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis.† Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (2003): page nr. Accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no3.htm. Davis, Jack. â€Å"The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty.† Central Intelligence Agency. April 14, 2007. Accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/davis.htm. Director of National Intelligence. â€Å"Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.† nytimes.com. December 7, 2007. Accessed from http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20071203_release.pdf. George, Roger. Analyzing Intelligence Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008. Kissinger, Henry. â€Å"Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking Don’t Mix†. Washington Post, December 2007. Pillar, Paul R. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Rovner, Joshua. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011. Zegart, Amy B. â€Å"Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.† Masters thesis, UCLA School of Public Affairs, 2010. Accessed from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6341/Zegart_Research_Seminar_-_Cuban_missile_crisis_paper_Sept._21,_2010.pdf. Footnotes 1 Director of National Intelligence, â€Å"Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,† nytimes.com, December 7, 2007, accessed from http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20071203_release.pd f. 2 Amy B. Zegart, â€Å"Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis† (masters thesis, UCLA School of Public Affairs, 2010), 1-42, accessed from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6341/Zegart_Research_Seminar_-_Cuban_missile_crisis_paper_Sept._21,_2010.pdf. 3 Ibid. 4 Henry A. Kissinger, â€Å"Misreading the Iran Report,† Washington Post, December 13, 2007 5 Paul R. Pillar. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 6 Henry A. Kissinger, â€Å"Misreading the Iran Report,† Washington Post, December 13, 2007 7 Rovner, Joshua. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 8 John Bolton. â€Å"The Flaws In the Iran Report†. Washington Post, December 2007. 9 Amy B. Zegart, â€Å"Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis† (masters thesis, UCLA School of Public Affairs, 2010), 1 -42, accessed from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6341/Zegart_Research_Seminar_-_Cuban_missile_crisis_paper_Sept._21,_2010.pdf 10 Jack Davis, â€Å"Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations: The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty,† Central Intelligence Agency, April 14, 2007, accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/davis.htm. 11 Jack Davis, â€Å"Sherman Kents Final Thoughts On Analyst-Policymaker Relations: The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis†,Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (2003): page nr., accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no3.htm. 12 Betts, Richard K. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security ( New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007), 34. 13 Jack Davis, â€Å"Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations: The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty,† Central Intelligence Agency, April 14, 2007, accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/davis.htm. 14 Director of National Intelligence, â€Å"Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,† nytimes.com, December 7, 2007, accessed from http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20071203_release.pdf 15 Bolton, John. The Flaws In the Iran Report. Washington Post, December 6, 2007. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/05/AR2007120502234.html?hpid=opinionsbox1 16Jack Davis, â€Å"Sherman Kents Final Thoughts On Analyst-Policymaker Relations: The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis†,Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (2003): page nr., accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no3.htm. 17Jack Davis, â€Å"Sherman Kents Final Thoughts On Analyst-Policymaker Relations: The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis†,Occasional Papers 2, no. 3 (2003): page nr., access ed from https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no3.htm. 18 Roger George. Analyzing Intelligence Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008). 19 Bolton, John. The Flaws In the Iran Report. Washington Post, December 6, 2007. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/05/AR2007120502234.html?hpid=opinionsbox1 20 Adelberg, Michael. The American Revolution in Monmouth County: The Theatre of Spoil and Destruction (Charleston, SC: History Press, 2010), 21. 21 Jack Davis, â€Å"Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations: The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty,† Central Intelligence Agency, April 14, 2007, accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/davis.htm. 22 Amy B. Zegart, â€Å"Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis† (masters thesis, UCLA School of Public Affairs, 2010), 1-42, accessed from ht tp://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6341/Zegart_Research_Seminar_-_Cuban_missile_crisis_paper_Sept._21,_2010.pdf 23 Director of National Intelligence, â€Å"Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,† nytimes.com, December 7, 2007, accessed from http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/20071203_release.pdf